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Presented paper is going to introduce contemporary Slovak ethical theory, the ethics 
of social consequences and the principle of humanity in particular. The ethics of social 
consequences can be characterized as a contemporary ethical theory, along with its approach 
as a specific form of consequentialism. Non-utilitarian consequentialism (the position which 
the ethics of social consequences identifies itself with) is a relatively new form of 
consequentialism which began to accommodate itself only in the late 20th century. It is a form 
of consequentialism130 which develops from the critique of utilitarianism (classical 
consequentialism). This critique comes from different sources, namely from ethical theories 
which don’t classify themselves as consequentialist at one hand (at most times its deontology 
or/and ethics of virtue), but mostly from consequentialism itself.  
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Introduction 
The ethics of social consequences can be characterized as a contemporary ethical 
theory, along with its approach as a specific form of consequentialism. Non-utilitarian 
consequentialism (the position which the ethics of social consequences identifies itself with) 
is a relatively new form of consequentialism which began to accommodate itself only in the 
late 20th century. It is a form of consequentialism131 which develops from the critique of 
utilitarianism (classical consequentialism). This critique comes from different sources, 
namely from ethical theories which don’t classify themselves as consequentialist at one hand 




Ethics of social consequences can be characterized as consequentialist ethical theory 
with inclination to act utilitarianism and case oriented approach. The case oriented approach 
is acknowledged as better way of dealing with specific moral issues of everyday life. Other 
aspects of ethics of social consequences are: moderate subjectivity, hedonism and partial 
eudemonism. Even this might signalize certain similarity with utilitarianism, ethics of social 
consequences can’t be associated with it.  
                                                          
130 The term consequentialism cannot be used to entitle one complex ethical theory nowadays. In today’s notion 
(which I identify with) this term is used mostly as a label for a group of ethical theories with similar 
characteristics and most importantly the same scope (focus on outcomes) - consequences.    
131 The term consequentialism cannot be used to entitle one complex ethical theory nowadays. In today’s notion 
(which I identify with) this term is used mostly as a label for a group of ethical theories with similar 
characteristics and most importantly the same scope (focus on outcomes) - consequences.    
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One of the main reasons why not, is that ethics of social consequences doesn’t operate 
with utility and rather uses the concept of positive social consequences.132 Another very 
strong argument is, that the ethics of social consequences doesn’t advocate the position of 
agent-neutral (as classical utilitarianism does)133 and rather defend the agent-relative position. 
Last but not least, it is the objection against the principle of maximization which can help us 
to clearly separate the ethics of social consequences from classical consequentialism – 
utilitarianism.  
But there is one similarity with utilitarianism and all of the theories that are 
characterized as consequentialist – consequences. As well as all of the consequentialist 
ethical theories, ethics of social consequences is based on consequences. Consequences are 
understood as an outcome of attitudes, decision making and subsequent acts of moral agent. It 
must be stressed out, that consequences in consequentialism are just one of the ways how to 
evaluate the acts. Not the only one, though the most important. Ethics of social consequences 
is using motives and intentions as additional criterion. Evaluation and subsequent justification 
of action is in ethics of social consequences based on expected consequences at the beginning 
– as a preliminary and informative evaluation made before the act. Then the evaluation is 
done ex posto – after the act is finished and it’s based on actual consequences. Thus 
evaluation based on expected consequences is used only to verify the decision making and 
moral reflection of the agent and is connected with agent motives (Kalajtzidis, 2013, pp. 167-
168).  
The core values of ethics of social consequences are: humanity, human dignity and 
moral right. Secondary, or auxiliary values closely interconnected with primary once are: 
responsibility and justice.134  
Even the responsibility is classified as secondary value in ethics of social 
consequences, it is still very important topic. One of the reasons why it’s interesting, is that 
even the notion of responsibility is widely prevalent and used, it is still defined very weakly 
and broadly in its ethical-philosophical notion. The legal notion of responsibility is quite wide 
as well but still clear. 135 The issue of responsibility in its moral aspect is a different story. It is 
not the main aim of the paper to introduce this issue, so we will just imply 3 different ways of 
understanding it. One of the “out of consequentialism” understandings can be found in 
writings of Bilasová. She claims, that responsibility (in its moral connotation) is a 
prerequisite of European ethos of 21st century. Responsibility of individuals, community and 
even institutions and countries is strongly interconnected with building of strong, democratic 
and safe Europe and world in general. The responsible individuals and responsible society is 
prerequisite of globalization in general and unification of Europe in particular (Bilasová, 
2012, pp. 173-174). Entirely different notion of issue of responsibility can be in writings of 
                                                          
132 Positive social consequences can be characterized as consequences which helps to satisfy the necessity of 
moral agent, social community or society as such. They are the essential condition of the “good” (Gluchman, 
1994, p. 16; Gluchman, 1999, p. 18).    
133 Distinction between theories based on the position they hold towards the agent, comes from Philip Pettit. 
Pettit claims, that if we refrain from the position that rightness can be achieved only by an agent-neutral 
position, than we can mark even typically non-consequentialistic theories as consequentialistic (Pettit, 1997, 
pp.129-130).  
134 All of those values have been elaborated (as a values of ethics of social consequences) within writings of 
different authors from the field of applied and professional ethics. Within medical ethics and bioethics in the 
writings of Lešková Blahová (2010, 2009), within business ethics and teaching ethics in the writings of Platková 
Olejárová (2009, 2013) or within ethics of animals in the writings of Komenská (2013). One of the best is the 
collection of essays written by team of authors under supervision of Gluchman (2011).    
135 There are many ways of how to organize the issue of responsibility. The most basic one is to distinguish legal 
and moral responsibility. Then there is possibility to distinguish it with consideration of time: perspective, 
retrospective. Then there is a problem of action and omission. Is it okay to ascribe the responsibility only for 
what we did, or even for what we didn’t?   
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Lačný. As well as Bilasová, Lačný is working with the issue of responsibility in its moral 
meaning but in very different way. He uses the issue of responsibility in the study of 
corporate social responsibility. Responsibility is understood as a liability. It can be 
understood as liability of company towards competition, consumers or public (Lačný, 2012, 
p. 40).     
On one hand (in Bilasová) the responsibility is understood as an essential condition to 
achieve democracy and unity. The responsibility is understood in its metaphysical 
understanding. On the other hand (in Lačný) the responsibility is understood as an essential 
condition to achieve better functioning of business. The responsibility is understood as a duty 
of business towards society. In ethics of social consequences, the responsibility (moral 
responsibility) is understood at least in three primary ways. Responsibility can be understood 
as availability, as duty and as guaranty. Availability as an qualification of being moral agent, 
duty as an ability to be able to act upon required and guaranty as an ability to bear the 
consequences (Kalajtzidis, 2012, pp. 132-138).   
   We understand the humanity as protection, support and development of human life 
that usually brings positive social consequences. That is the reason that the protection of 
either own life or the lives of our relatives, friends, and on the other hand even strangers and 
unknown people is undoubtedly the form of behavior and acting bringing positive social 
consequences (Gluchman, 2008, p. 77). From the point of view of ethics of social 
consequences, not only the protection of life136 in any form137 is assessed, but even the 
support of own life as well as altruistic voluntarily help towards the development of unknown 
life (that is, according to me, even more valuable).  
 As the protection and whatever support of the development of human life brings us 
positive social consequences, people naturally tend to protect and support life in any forms 
that results in positive social consequences. Therefore, the idea of producing positive social 
consequences leads them to the protection or the support of the life of relatives and even 
unknown people. The reason is not only our awareness of duty to act in order to produce 
positive social consequences, but predominantly our compassion with suffering people and 
our need to help to protect and support the life. Thus, people act in this way not only 
voluntarily, but the reason of their will to help in keeping and supporting lives is the rate of 
positive social consequences in executing the humanity.  
 From this point of view, it means that the primary value of positive social 
consequences can be assign to taking care of the protection and the development of their own 
life. It can be mathematically expressed, for instance, with the rate/figure 1. Further we go on 
biological or genetic line as a source of humanity realization, i.e. taking care of the protection 
and the support of life, higher the value of positive social consequences resulting from our 
behavior and acting is. Taking care of life of our children could be specified with rate 1,25, 
parents 1,5, relatives from 1,75 to 2,5, friends from 3,0 to 5,0 and humanity realization in the 
relation to strangers and unknown people could be specified with the rate from 7,5 and higher 
(Gluchman, 2008, p. 78 - 79).  
 Gluchman states that every adult moral agent gains primary value as a human, based 
on the fact of his existence, but the demand on the respect of his dignity and humanity in the 
relation to himself, must permanently be confirmed by his acting, more specifically by the 
character of his acting that should be in accordance with valid and acceptable moral norms 
(even legal norms to some point – e.g. the right to live) or at least should not be in contrast 
with it (Gluchman, 1997, p. 156).  
                                                          
136 Preferentially in questions of the physician – patient relationship (mainly in the questions concerning 
euthanasia, for instance). 
137 Human beings, animals, or plants. 
European Scientific Journal November 2014 /SPECIAL/ edition vol.2 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
243 
 Gluchman reasons that our acting is autonomous if we produce an acting bringing 
positive social consequences based just on our own free will, we help to protect and develop 
the life from our own self-determined belief that we are responsible for. The result is “the 
reward” or assessment in the form of the rate of positive social consequences resulting from 
our acting. The man is understood in ethics of social consequences as a free rational being 
able to make decisions freely and responsibly in spite of being determined by particular 
factors, either objective or subjective, and is able to act creatively and apply his will in 
practical life (Gluchman, 1994, p. 23).  
 According to ethics of social consequences, human beings, for instance mentally 
disabled individuals, have primary equivalent value of human dignity, moral equality based 
on their homo sapiens origin. They can try to reach the greatest positive social consequences 
resulting from the accepting and realizing human dignity depending on the degree of 
disability during their development. However, they never reach the status of moral agents as 
there is no potential of their moral, mental and psychical development worth of moral agents. 
In theoretical definition of ethics of social consequences, moral agent acts and makes 
decisions based on moral values, to be aware of the responsibility for particular consequences 
of his acting, his moral duty and of what he should do. Human beings without such 
competences are not able to responsibly make decision, act and do not bear the responsibility 
for their accomplished achievements. We cannot blame, for instance, mentally disabled and 
sick human for not being able to perform some act in a way we expect it from him or we 
cannot blame mentally disabled individuals for negative consequences resulting from his 
non-targeted negative activity caused by their insufficient competency and inability to being 
responsible for certain consequences. Though, in spite of that we approach them with respect 
as they are human beings fulfilling the basic criterion of the life existence (not looking at the 
state and quality in which particular life is). The fact that the man is not able to do something 
is not the reason for his condemnation and execration. We would always talk about conscious 
targeted activity in case of healthy, morally competent individuals, but psychically disrupted 
man do not act consciously, even though he makes decision by himself freely, because it’s 
really hard to talk about conscious activity in such a human beings.  
 Thanks to their free will or moral freedom, the man has the possibility of autonomous 
acting. As we wrote earlier, further we move on biological, or genetic line from ourselves, 
from the help to ourselves, as a source in approaching the humanity, i.e. care of the protection 
and the support of our own life with the help to others, higher the value of positive social 
consequences resulting from our behavior and acting is. Based on mentioned degree of 
positive social consequences, we can state, that it would be more valuable for the man to help 
in protecting and developing human lives of strange and unknown people on the ground of 
greater value share of positive social consequences in such acting such as protection of our 
own life and lives of our relatives (Gluchman, 2008, p. 79). However, there appears special 
moral duty towards our the closest relatives, some kind of moral responsibility that partially 
limits such acting and prohibit our autonomous acting based on our free will in some way in 
order to prefer acting that is more valuable from the point of view of positive social 
consequences. Awareness of this moral responsibility, moral duty towards our relatives puts 
such an acting man into higher place regarding his overall moral maturity of his awareness.  
 According to ethics of social consequences, we should protect and support the life, 
but as Gluchman specifies, “while it’s about the life minimally corresponding to qualitative 
criteria of human life” (Gluchman, 2008, p. 82). Well, paramedic (physician, for instance) 
would not harm sick moral agent who is able to live, from the point of view of the principle 
of humanity, in accordance with the principle of non-maleficence in comparison to the 
principles of ethics of social consequences, therefore he approaches the life with respect. He 
respects the life, because it means the good itself and therefore he tries to heal him.  
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 Consequently, we focus our attention on the comparison of the principle of humanity 
with biomedical principles formulated by Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress. They 
formulated four principles of biomedical ethics – respect for autonomy, beneficence, 
nonmaleficence, justice. The term beneficence connotes acts of mercy, kindness, and charity. 
Forms of beneficence also typically include altruism, love and humanity. We use beneficence 
to cover beneficent action more broadly, so that it includes all forms of action intended to 
benefit other persons. Benevolence refers to the character trait or virtue of being disposed to 
act for the benefit of others. Principle of beneficence refers to a statement of moral obligation 
to act for the benefit of others. Many acts of beneficence are not obligatory, but some forms 
of beneficence are obligatory (Beauchamp, Childress, 2009, p. 197). The term merging all 
these attributes of the principles of beneficence is the good. The good is everything that 
fulfills the life of the human beings with the feelings of joy, pleasure, safety, happiness, 
peace, comfort, social confidence and satisfaction within ethics of social consequences. The 
good is understood as something that helps to fulfill human dignity, agent’s social adaptation, 
adaptation in family life, further in life at work etc. The good is one of morality criterion and 
the highest moral principle in the terms of ethics of social consequences at the same time 
(Gluchman, 1995, p. 90). Therefore we could say that moral agent aiming at the beneficence 
is kind, merciful and human, acts and achieves good, meaning positive social consequences. 
That is the aim of the existence of each moral agent living his/her own life in cooperation 
with other individuals in society. At the first sight, we could state that the positive social 
consequences consisting or performing the good in itself would correspond to the principle of 
beneficence in some way within the ethics of social consequences.  
 Beauchamp and Childress consider the principle of autonomy to be the principle of 
high importance within biomedical ethics. According to them, stated principle presents the 
autonomous individual acts freely in accordance with a self-chosen plan, analogous to the 
way an independent government manages its territories and establishes its policies in all the 
spheres of life. Authors state that a person of diminished autonomy, by contrast, is in some 
respect controlled by others or incapable of deliberating or acting on the basis of his or her 
desires and plans. For example, cognitively challenged individuals and prisoners often have 
diminished autonomy. They integrate two conditions as essential for autonomy: liberty 
(independence from controlling influences) and agency (capacity for intentional action) 
(Beauchamp, Childress, 2009, pp. 99-100). 
 According to the authors, an autonomous person who signs a consent form for a 
procedure without reading or understanding the form can act autonomously, but fails to do so. 
Of course, we could re-describe the act as one of placing the trust in one’s physician, which 
could be an autonomous act of authorizing the physician to proceed the act. But it is not an 
autonomous authorization of the procedure because it is not informed, regarding the 
procedure. Similarly, somebody who is generally incapable of autonomous decision making 
can make autonomous choices sometimes. For example, some patients in mental institutions 
who cannot care for themselves and have been declared legally incompetent may still make 
some autonomous choices and decisions, such as stating preferences for meals, refusing 
medications and making telephone calls to their family relatives (Beauchamp, Childress, 
2009, p. 100). 
 We tried to confront the principle of humanity within ethics of social consequences 
with biomedical principles of beneficence and respect for autonomy as free independent 
acting in relation to the protection and the development of unknown people or relatives in 
which the value or positive social consequences rate have been the most significant factor. 
The acting producing mainly positive social consequences in individual’s activity is an 
influential measure in both principles. Now we are trying to ask how we can confront the 
principle of humanity in ethics of social consequences with the principle of nonmaleficence. 
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Beauchamp and Childress characterize the principle of nonmaleficence as a principle 
obliging us not to harm the others. This term has both a normative and a non-normative use. 
“X harmed Y” sometimes means that X wronged Y or treated Y unjustly, but it sometimes 
means only that X’s action had an adverse effect on Y’s interests. As we use these notions, 
wronging involves violating someone’s rights, but harming need not signify such a violation. 
People are harmed without being wronged in attacks by disease, natural disasters, bad luck 
and acts by others to which the harmed person has consented. People can always be wronged 
without being harmed (Beauchamp, Childress, 2009, p. 152). According to Gert, the principle 
of nonmaleficence supports several more specific moral rules that moral agent should follow, 
make decisions and act. This consists the rules and paradigms such as not to kill, not to cause 
pain or suffering, not to incapacitate, not to cause offense and not to deprive others of the 
goods of life (Gert, 1988, p. 32).   
Thus, we can state that we deal with the principles of favors and the support of others 
and their harmlessness within the relationship of the principles of nonmaleficence and the 
principles of beneficence. The obligations not to harm the others are sometimes more strict 
than the obligations to help them. If the health care provider in particular case cause very 
small injury (let’s say, swelling after the needle injection) than we consider the obligation of 
the beneficence has been superior to the obligation of nonmaleficence (Davis, 1994, p. 329). 
150 
 Beauchamp and Childress claim that if nonmaleficence overrides beneficence in some 
cases, the best utilitarian outcome would be obtained by acting beneficiently. If a surgeon, for 
instance, could save two innocent lives by killing a prisoner on death row to retrieve his heart 
and liver for transplantation, this outcome would have the highest net utility (according to the 
circumstances), but the surgeon’s action would be morally indefensible (Beauchamp, 
Childress, 2009, p. 150). According to them, in the given example, the final consequence of 
overall acting would be valued positively, but the surgeon would have to act against the 
principles of humanity and human dignity (and also against his own will) that he should keep 
under all the conditions within the relationship to the life (whether the murder committing 
crime or human being acting good). We rather hold the view that the physician should 
primarily show the respect in any life form, trying to reach positive social consequences and 
secondarily I would look at the perspective of the contribution of the acting, existence of two 
innocent people in society and their moral growth, development and overall potential 
contribution to society based on ethics of social consequences. Truly said, prisoner sentenced 
to death is not perspective moral agent who has not any hope to be the contribution for the 
society and the potentiality of his further development.  
 However, if we look at the problem from the point of view of the principle of 
beneficence, it requires moral agents balance their advantages, risks and costs with the aim to 
produce the outcomes. Utility also deals with the virtue of beneficence, various forms of the 
care and optional beneficial ideals. These differences (making the conflicts essential) between 
beneficence and the respect for the autonomy appear in paternalistic requests accepting the 
patient’s wishes or in public processes accepted for the protection or improvement of 
individual’s health (Hanson, 2009, p. 12). Currently, the paternalism of physicians is less 
important in favor of patient’s autonomy, respect to his/her existence and generally respect to 
the life of the human beings.  
 Even Onora O’Neill tends to the move from fully paternalistic model in medical 
ethics that proposes and points to the fact that this model was not sufficient to provide 
adequate reasoning/justification to the legitimate trust. The trust is the basic element of ideal 
relationship between physician and patient. That means more adequate ground for the trust 
presupposed the patients being in morally more equivalent relationship with the physicians 
and that meant they would have to be better informed and less dependent (O’Neill, 2002, p. 
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18). Replacement of paternalistic model by the trust means sharing the information as well as 
providing the consultation and in this way providing the support to patient’s ability to act 
autonomously. Such a model of the relationship of the physician and the patient presents the 
best health care – on one hand, the physicians share their knowledge and opinions with the 
patients and on the other hand the patients are able to act in independent and autonomous way 
based on such an information (however it’s not about a dependant relationship) (McLean, 
2010, p. 10).  
 In this sense, we see the analogy of ethics of social consequences with the principle of 
nonmaleficence. The goal is not to harm in both cases. There we can see clear analogy 
between these theories. Specifically it’s about the impartiality in relationship to providing the 
help and the care about the people that need our help or are at risk of their own health state or 
life. On one hand, ethics of social consequences accepts our effort to protect our own lives 
and lives of our relatives as natural-biological attribute, but on the other hand, ethics of social 
consequences offers the help to a stranger as valuably “more advantageous” choice as the 
further we move on genetic line from the care of our own life towards the care of the life of 
strange human beings, the greater moral value has our effort to help or preservation of life 
existence because it is something over our natural-biological determination.  
 Morality asks for respecting the autonomy of the people and for avoiding harm, but 
also contributing to the welfare, benefit and overall utility in society. These beneficial acts are 
included within the term beneficence. The principles of beneficence potentially demand much 
more than the principles of nonmaleficence because the agents have to take reliable steps to 
help the others, not just to avoid the harm. Here we can see, for example, clear analogy 
between active and passive form of humanity in ethics of social consequences. Whereas the 
active form of humanity expect from us particular kind of acting tending to the protection, 
eventually the support and the development of the life itself, passive form of humanity can 
mean for example even not acting, meaning harmlessness of other human being or for 
example even compassion with other human being in his/her suffering, misery, poverty, need 
etc. (Gluchman, 2008, p. 86). Beneficence and utility played important roles in particular 
ethical theories. For example, “even utilitarism is systematically ordered following the 
principle of beneficence” (Parfit, 1984, p. 366). 
 Other principles such as beneficence and nonmaleficence help to cause some of these 
similar rules, such as tell the truth, respect the privacy of others, protect the confidential 
information, gain the patient’s agreement for the treatment and, last but not least, if we are 
asked, we help the others to make important decisions. All of these rules are even moral 
obligations/duties of moral agents (in medical field – health care workers) at the same time 
and we can find them expressed within ethics of social consequences determination. 
Primarily, we should care about the patient’s autonomy and his rights whereas we care about 
the consequences by our decisions and acting, specifically we are aiming at achieving 
prevalence of positive social consequences over negative ones. And we can achieve it only by 
the respect in relationship to the lives of all human beings. The principle of humanity shows 
us and encourages us to take care not just about the life of human beings but also about any 
other form of living life having some significant signs of life.  
 
Conclusion 
 We came to the conclusion and finding that the principle of humanity is related and 
dependent on individual biomedical principles. We did the comparison of the principle of 
humanity within ethics of social consequences with the principle of nonmaleficence and the 
principle of beneficence. Similarly we came to conclusion that the principle of respect for 
autonomy necessarily depends on the principle of humanity within ethics of social 
consequences. Gluchman stated that our acting is autonomous in specific sense. This 
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(autonomy) depends on the fact that how we are able to dispose with the free will and moral 
freedom.  
 The term humanity is not only the protection of life and following the effort to keep it 
by all means. Life as a moral value should be protected and supported in its development, if it 
minimally matches qualitative criteria at least. If not, we do not extend the suffering and 
finish the life, or rather let him die. Other case is the life of a newborn in which we can see 
the hope and the assumption of his mental and physical development. Therefore, from the 
point of view of utility, the life of newborn is more beneficial, more potential for us, for 
humanity, especially regarding the development of rational, cognitive and physical skills and 
abilities of such an individual.  
 Personally, we hold the view that physician should primarily show respect to any 
form of life, seek to do positive social consequences and secondarily, we would see the 
perspective of acting benefit, existence of two innocent people within society and their moral 
growth, development and overall potential asset for society based on ethics of social 
consequences. Truthfully, for instance, prisoner sentenced to death is not perspective moral 
agent and there is no hope for being the contribution to the society and we cannot find any 
potential of his further development.  
Though the history of human thinking, there were times when philosophers were 
creating ethical theories – or philosophical systems in abstracto.138 But this times are over. 
Today’s ethical theories don’t want or need to be a theory for theory, ethical theory only as 
topic of intellectual discussions. What we need is practical ethical theory. Practical in the 
meaning that it can be put in the use in everyday life, that it can help us to resolve our 
problems. The one of the ways how this can be achieved, is to be suitable methodological 
base for applied ethics. We certainly hope, that ethics of social consequences can live up to 
this demand.    
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